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Abstract: 
In recent years, dozens of books on philosophy and popular culture have been published. 
These books have been subjected to a number of criticisms in a number of venues—including other 
popular philosophy venues. In this paper, I will examine several versions of the criticism that such 
endeavors are frivolous entertainment. I will argue that, though most of these criticisms do not stand 
up to scrutiny, they nevertheless express a legitimate worry about the intercourse of philosophy and 
entertainment. This, I contend, is a criticism the ‘philosophy and popular culture’ genre must live 
with—and one that cannot easily be dismissed. 
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Imagine a world… 
Imagine for a moment the following: hell-bent on the destruction of philosophy, several ne’er-
do-well PhDs get together with the aim of destroying the discipline. Their strategy: to release a series of 
books that put the standard tools of philosophy on display, highlighting some of philosophy’s central 
questions and answers, introducing some of philosophy’s most famous practitioners, and exploring the 
arguments they’ve offered. But, scandalous as it may seem, these PhDs want to make these questions 
accessible. That means leaving out technicality, and ignoring the difficult details. In other words, these 
revolutionaries will bring to publishing what they already bring to undergraduate instruction: a first-pass 
at the issues at stake, hoping to whet the appetites of those they encounter.  
Philosophy is an old discipline. Our rogue PhDs know that defeating her will not be easy. 
She has survived execution, censorship, and countless announcements of her death. She even 
survived Wittgenstein ‘ending’ her—twice. The key to the death of the discipline is dazzlingly 
simplistic: these espiegle academicians have decided to show that philosophy isn’t just for the well-
trained, and it isn’t just something one does in a college classroom. They’ve decided to make 
philosophy apply to absolutely everything, and to show that it is relevant to absolutely everyone. In 
this way, these hateful ‘philosophers’ are convinced they will kill the love of wisdom once and for all. 
This is an exaggerated version of the kind of argument one sometimes hears about the various 
‘and philosophy’ books that have been getting published in recent years1: pop culture cheapens 
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philosophy, making it appear as frivolous, dispensable nonsense. When the gloves come off, we hear 
the further criticism that these books are not ‘real’ philosophy—or worse still, that they are 
incompetent philosophy.2 
 Few would deny that there’s a difference between academic philosophy and popular philosophy, 
though this difference is harder to locate than one might initially suspect. One difference between pop 
philosophy and the more academic variety is, of course, style. But this isn’t the entire story. Very few 
would object to a writer demonstrating his or her stylistic chops, even in the confines of the academy. A 
great many academic philosophers are stylists of the highest order (think Mill, Rorty, Quine). Moreover, 
a great many canonized philosophers of the past put style on a par with content (think Plato, Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard). Indeed, philosophy as a form of popular writing is nearly as old as philosophy itself.3 
Objections to popular philosophy are very seldom objections to philosophy that garners a wide audience.  
And yet the objections express a very real worry—one that emerges as we, as a profession, 
confront the rather unflattering public perception of our chosen discipline. 
In some ways, the situation for philosophy seems dire: Nobel Laureates claim philosophy has got 
nothing to offer;4 television personalities make fun of it; op-eds suggest it is an outmoded artifact no 
longer useful (if it ever was) to degree-seeking students.  
For their part, proponents of philosophy and pop culture are usually forthright about what 
it is that they’re trying to do. The oft-stated aim of pop philosophy that utilizes pop culture is “to 
provide students with the skills and the desire to engage in serious philosophical reading and 
reflection on their own” (Bassham and Austin 2008, 7). These skills, in turn, are lauded as necessary 
for building a better society.5 
I feel no need to defend philosophy in this context. My question, rather, is this one: is there any 
reason to be worried about using pop culture as a way of introducing the general public to philosophy? 
Is there any truth behind the hyperbole of the conspiratorial objection with which we began? I think 
there is some truth to it—but not perhaps where critics believe. When philosophy attempts to add some 
reflection to an entertainment culture by engaging that culture on its own terms, it risks itself. This is a 
legitimate worry. Seeing why and how this worry emerges is, in my view, the best way to understand it.6  
 
Two approaches to the popularization of philosophy: the birth of a tension 
 The United States is characterized by a stunning philosophically illiteracy.7 The standard 
images of the philosopher are of the old white-male—robed, tunic-ed or toga-ed—staring off into 
the distance, pondering the imponderables. And yet the story of Thales, if it were known to the 
general public, might well resonate: Thales, the legend has it, was so absorbed in thought that he 
didn’t notice the well he was approaching—and fell into it. Fixated on the operations of the heavens, 
Thales became blind to the realities of the world. Our cultural conception of the philosopher is 
decidedly Thalesian: the philosopher is so lost in esoteric thought that he cannot see the world 
around him; his abstraction blinds him to reality; he falls into wells when he encounters them.8 
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 The many forms of popular philosophy—the blog, the op-ed, the ‘pop culture and 
philosophy’ books, the other attempts at mass appeal—have this much in common: they aim to 
make philosophy relevant to our daily lives. The way they do this, of course, differs remarkably. The 
philosophical public intellectual tries to bring the tools of philosophy directly to bear on the issues 
of the day: animal welfare, torture, social and economic equality, racism and sexism. The hope is that 
philosophy—here understood as the careful and critical examination of evidence and argument in 
order to discern the appropriate courses of action—will be palatable enough on its own, provided 
it’s stripped of its often burdensome technical vocabulary. On the other end of the public 
philosophy spectrum, an attempt has been made to show how philosophical questions arise 
everywhere—and hence to demonstrate, somewhat indirectly, that the tools of philosophy are not as 
esoteric or impractical as one might think. This is a core motivation behind the many ‘and philosophy’ 
books that have now found their way into bookstores around the world. In both cases—the public 
philosopher and the pop culture enthusiast—the philosopher tries to keep Thales out of the well. 
 But the strategies differ. On the one hand, the public philosopher argues that the issues at 
stake are simply too important to ignore the significant advantages of philosophical education. 
Solving the problems of the world requires utilizing precisely those skills the study of philosophy is 
meant to provide: critical acumen, independent and creative thinking, and a concern for good 
reasoning. On the other hand, given the philosophical illiteracy of our culture and the negative 
public perception of philosophy, simply insisting on philosophy’s value isn’t likely to convince 
anyone. To get folks to employ the skills of philosophy, we’ve got to get them to understand what 
philosophy is, and how it can be used to tackle a host of current issues. To do this, though, we must 
engage people where their interests lie—and they lie in the popular cultural artifacts of our age.9 
 The public philosopher worries that his credentials aren’t taken seriously; that his use of 
philosophical methods has been de-legitimated by a culture that esteems and degrades religion and science 
in equal parts, but which has no place for something called ‘philosophy.’ The pop culture enthusiast wants 
to change the public perception of philosophy too, but wants to do this by making philosophy as 
accessible as can be, and by meeting folks where they already are: in front of their televisions, reading their 
mass paperbacks and graphic novels, listening to Metallica and the Rolling Stones. 
 There is obviously a potential for tension between these approaches—and the tension has 
often been explicitly expressed. The worry is that the pop culture enthusiast demeans philosophy—
makes it frivolous—by applying it to television shows, vampire novels, and blockbuster films. The 
worry is that such uses of philosophy will make it more difficult to get philosophy taken seriously by 
the public at large. The charge is thus sometimes made that the ‘philosophy and pop culture’ genre 
is actually doing the opposite of what it is trying to do—it is perpetuating the misconception that 
philosophy has nothing to offer, that it is pointless—that it is just so much more entertainment. 
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Culture Wars, Popular Philosophy Style 
Maurice Natanson once said that “academic philosophy may be the last stronghold of 
subsidized madness.” (1986, 2) Remarkably, he made this claim in a work of academic philosophy, albeit 
one with more style than most such publications can claim. Some of this madness gets expressed in often 
biting criticism of the genre of pop culture and philosophy. Indeed, this genre has become an occasion 
for some of the mad to sharpen their fangs. One blogger (‘Spiros’) bares his fangs as follows: 
 
The past several weeks have brought an incredible number of "calls for abstracts" for volumes in the 
various "pop culture and philosophy" series. As I've argued previously on this blog, these books are 
an embarrassment to our profession and should be boycotted. The enterprise reached a new low, 
however, this morning with the announcement of a volume on Spider Man and Philosophy. 
Yes, at first the idea of such a volume seems no more stupid and useless than the others. But wait. As 
is typical, the "call for abstracts" includes a rather long and random list of silly suggested paper topics. 
In addition to the obvious suggestions-- which involve nothing more than taking a perennial 
philosophical question and inserting Spider-Man into it (e.g., "Spider-Man and the problem of evil"; 
"Spider-Man and personal identity")-- there is the suggestion that one might write a paper on "Just 
how does Spidey-sense work?" 
Finally the series becomes aware of itself: An open invitation to utter bullshit.10 
 
 This is followed up by a ‘comments’ section that is brutally mean, where ad hominem attacks 
emerge in the guise of genuine empirical observation: 
 
All one has to do is take a look at any of the volumes to find that they're a haven for the 
incompetent.11 
 
 In response to a comment that attempts to defend these books, the anonymous philosopher 
(‘Spiros’) writes: 
 
To be sure, there are a few good things that happen to appear in these volumes. But on the whole, 
they're very, very bad: poorly written, poorly argued bullshitting, all under the deluded self-
description of making philosophy "relevant" (by doing it poorly).12 
 
 As much as I’d like to pick on Spiros’ remarks,13 I think his blog contributes to the 
popularization of philosophy in one of its most central functions: critique. Besides, I actually love 
Spiros’ blog—it’s irreverent, cranky, and full of fun-loving cynicism. The interesting question, from 
my point of view, is what motivates the criticisms of pop culture books on a website that is itself 
attempting to bring a cranky variety of philosophy to bear on popular culture? Why do some people 
so vehemently hate this kind of popularizing of philosophy? What motivates one commenter to call 
the pedagogical efforts of the ‘philosophy and pop culture’ books ‘pop fluff wankery’? 
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As these by-no-means isolated comments suggest, some professional philosophers worry 
that the work carried out under the auspices of ‘philosophy and popular culture’ is both frivolous 
and dangerous. It is frivolous, one might argue, because it makes philosophical labor seem to be more 
a matter of entertainment than a matter of serious scholarly activity. It is dangerous because these 
series have been astonishingly successful. From the point of view of the critic, then, such books are 
encouraging the view that philosophy itself is a matter of entertainment, and hence needn’t be taken 
seriously. In a culture where philosophy is often seen as dispensable, or even worse as outright self-
indulgent navel-gazing, philosophy and pop culture books thus sometimes seem to constitute more 
ammunition in the on-going assault against significant philosophical work. 
And yet, what likely lies behind this hatred of the genre is a legitimate fear that the 
humanities are and will continue to be increasingly marginalized in cultural conversations. As 
philosophy departments are threatened with being shut-down (and then often are shut-down) 
because philosophy is regarded as irrelevant, it may be natural to think that books like X-Men and 
Philosophy or Twilight and Philosophy are contributing to an untenable conception of philosophy 
as merely entertainment. Is there anything to this claim? 
 
Philosophy as/and Entertainment 
 To demonstrate that the pop culture genre of philosophy diminishes philosophy’s public 
reputation, reducing it to mere entertainment, we’d also need to demonstrate, first, that the activities 
of professional philosophers do not contribute to the view that philosophy is mere entertainment. 
Second, we’d need to demonstrate that philosophy was taken more seriously before the release of 
books on philosophy and popular culture. If we couldn’t show this, there would be no way to be 
certain that the ‘pop culture’ books were uniquely responsible for the public perception of philosophy 
as frivolous and inconsequential. And, to be blunt, I don’t think it’s possible to show either thing. 
 As noted above, a philosophical illiteracy characterizes American culture. That illiteracy, at 
least in part, stems from the specialization we find in every discipline—it is by no means unique to 
philosophy. Every discipline has its own language—its own set of established positions, and its 
established way of talking about them. As with any technical enterprise, philosophy has developed a 
technical language that is utterly foreign to the uninitiated.14  
Our esoteric, technical languages are certainly part of the problem. An arcane, jargon-heavy 
vocabulary can make us seem, well, irrelevant. Most people have no sense of what philosophers 
actually do, let alone why they’re doing it, or why it might matter. To many people (and here I’m 
offering only anecdotal evidence), professional philosophy really is just entertainment. We are 
viewed as engaging in boutique questions with boutique answers, and arguing about things that do 
not require argumentation. Do the activities of professional philosophers contribute to the view that 
philosophy is merely entertainment? Unfortunately, given the above considerations, the answer is 
likely ‘yes’—not mass entertainment, to be sure, but elitist entertainment. We are too often seen as 
simply an irrelevant discipline. Given our irrelevance, members of the discipline—so the thinking 
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goes—are simply navel-gazing. Since what we do does not matter, we must be merely entertaining 
ourselves (this dominant perception of philosophy makes the exceptions truly exceptional).15 
Philosophy has always been taken seriously—perhaps too seriously—by some of its 
practitioners. But well before Seinfeld and Philosophy hit the shelves, the profession was busy 
worrying about its place in the popular imagination—and it was pointing fingers. Who’s to blame for 
the way the profession is perceived? Today, as we’ve seen, some blame (in part) the philosophy and pop 
culture books.16 But one can with equal plausibility argue that philosophy is not taken seriously because 
it has become so terribly esoteric. It has become, in part, the working out of puzzles—puzzles often 
generated by philosophizing itself—and we have done a poor job, as a discipline and in general, explaining 
how our puzzle-mongering connects with real-world issues. Or with anything, really.17  
The view that the use of pop culture diminishes philosophy, then, faces an important 
objection: philosophy is already diminished in popular consciousness, and has been for a long time. 
If we make introductory philosophy entertaining, the pop culture enthusiast contends, we might at 
least expand awareness of the issues and skills that characterize the discipline. It’s worth asking the 
question explicitly: is there something wrong with entertainment? 
Philosophers like Montaigne and Nietzsche are among the few who have defended the value 
of entertainment—at least when this is construed in terms of something like playful amusement. 
Montaigne, for example, provides a more-or-less utilitarian argument for entertainment. As 
Shusterman characterizes Montaigne’s view, “entertainment’s diversion of mind is not a necessarily 
negative feature that diminishes the mind by distracting its attention but rather, in dialectical 
fashion, strengthens the mind’s powers by providing it with both relief and alternative exercise in 
changing the focus and style of its activity” (Shusterman 2007, 137). 
Of course, the fact that entertainment can be of instrumental value is probably not 
something too many philosophers would reject. The bigger issue is whether or not the pop culture 
genre has benefits that outweigh its drawbacks. If people who read philosophy and pop culture 
books are provided with “alternative exercises” that change “the focus and style” of their mental 
activity, even if only temporarily, this might count as a real benefit. But this general argument would 
also apply to other forms of entertainment—to Seinfeld itself, with or without philosophy. 
To make the case that philosophy through pop culture has a distinct value as entertainment 
would require showing how it goes beyond the entertainment of other forms of popular culture. 
Thus, even a general defense of entertainment would not necessarily be a defense of philosophical 
entertainment. Indeed, it appears that defending this particular mode of entertainment requires 
showing that it is unlike all of the other readily available modes. If entertainment has its own value, 
in other words, it doesn’t need philosophy to make it valuable. 
I want to return, albeit very briefly, to the issue of context. If philosophical texts are a kind 
of dialogue between text and reader, and this dialogue, in proper Gadamerian fashion, can shape the 
person encountering a text, the question of whether or not pop philosophy has an effect on its 
readers will fundamentally hinge on who the readers are.  
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 This is presumably a familiar point: whether or not a piece of writing is ‘entertainment’ is a 
largely contextual matter. Consider for a moment Plato’s Phaedrus. In the dialogue, Plato’s Socrates 
distinguishes entertainment from philosophy. Philosophy is what occurs in living dialogue; 
entertainment is what is written down to amuse. Ironically, Plato draws this contrast in a text that 
winds up being an instance of entertainment, rather than an instance of philosophy. (True 
philosophy, Socrates claims, cannot be written down. It can only occur in living dialogue. Plato’s 
writing is thus not true philosophy, on this account, though it is certainly an invitation to engage in 
true philosophical activity). 
Entertainment, on one reading, is just amusement—or that which amuses. It is often used 
in a pejorative sense implying that what is entertaining is in fact a distraction from those things in 
life that actually matter. In Phaedrus, what matters is the active exchange that occurs in dialogue (as 
opposed to the mere recitation of speeches that have been prepared in advance). Such speeches (like 
the one Phaedrus himself recites) do not aspire to true philosophical engagement. It has, rather, all 
the marks of mere amusement: it is passive, something one witnesses and consumes rather than 
something one actively participates in. True philosophy, Plato tells us, is never passive.  
It is this conception of entertainment that undergirds the many criticisms of it we find in 
thinkers like Adorno, Heidegger, Arendt, Postman, and others. In the case of Plato, however, the 
critique applies to Plato’s own writings. A written account of a dialogue is not a dialogue; a snapshot 
of a philosophical exchange is not a philosophical exchange. And yet, it would be absurd to think 
that Plato’s writings are worthless simply because they meet one criterion of entertainment. 
Certainly Plato himself did not think that, despite the claim that he ‘never wrote his true 
philosophy.’18 Plato’s works were, rather, an invitation to engage in proper philosophy. These 
invitations have been incredibly, though of course not uniformly, successful. Their success has much 
to do with their ability to entertain, and their ability to entertain has everything to do with their style. 
Consider the absurdity, again from Phaedrus, of Socrates’ recitation of a speech while covering his 
head with a sheet. Or consider the account of female education in Republic, where Plato speaks of 
women ‘riding studs while they’re naked’—the clear sexual innuendo as present in the Greek as it is 
in the English. Such amusements are not incidental to Plato’s texts. Plato aims to entertain so that 
his readers will be drawn into true philosophical engagement.19  
Although this is precisely the aim of the ‘and philosophy book,’ it is somewhat perverse to 
compare these books to Plato’s work. In Plato’s writings, philosophy is never incidental. One cannot 
imagine Plato without the philosophical content. One can imagine Family Guy, or The Office, or 30 
Rock without it. One can philosophize in these arenas, to be sure, but the philosophy does not make 
them what they are. So, while the aim of such series has a powerful pedigree, it is disingenuous to 
suggest that they are therefore innocent by association. 
 The question thus remains: do these books manage to get beyond merely amusing? Pop 
culture enthusiasts should be prepared to admit that sometimes the ‘and philosophy’ books do not 
get beyond amusement. Sometimes they are just entertainment. Although essays in these books can 
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be excellent, they can also be formulaic. In every volume, one finds, undeniably and perhaps 
inevitably, the formulaic application of famous theories to more-or-less routine popular scenarios: 
one would be hard-pressed to find anything involving human action that really couldn’t be 
bludgeoned into illustrating utilitarianism. As readers deeply familiar with utilitarianism (or the 
mind/body problem, or the issue of freewill, or whatever), professional philosophers are more likely 
to regard these contributions as, well, not really contributions to the scholarly conversation. And 
they would be right, at least usually. But one person’s mere entertainment is another person’s 
window into something novel and stimulating. A standard introduction to utilitarianism, applied 
formulaically to some piece of pop culture, might well bore a reader of this piece to tears. But it 
might also provoke an entirely different reaction from someone who happened to be new to 
philosophy, or who had no familiarity with any of the ‘literatures’ we refer to when we do 
scholarship. 
Is this enough to answer the objection? Can we simply point out that some entertainment 
might still be education to some readers, and leave it at that? I think there is a legitimate worry about 
the genre that lurks beyond the complaints we’ve so far been considering—and one that the genre 
must simply live with. 
 
Entertaining philosophy (to death) 
 Philosophy ought to be engaging—but being engaging isn’t the same as being entertaining. 
If Frankfurt School style philosophy excelled at anything, it certainly excelled at making this 
distinction—both on the page and in practice. Indeed, the criticism of so-called ‘mass culture’ 
became its own industry among the emigrant philosophers of Germany: Marcuse’s One-
Dimensional Man, Adorno’s The Culture Industry, and work by Hannah Arendt all pointed to the 
same thing: the growth of an industry designed merely to entertain us is a sign of cultural decline. As 
Arendt described mass culture: 
 
 Its promoters are neither the masses nor their entertainers, but are those who try to entertain the 
masses with what once was an authentic object of culture, or to persuade them that Hamlet can be 
as entertaining as My Fair Lady, and educational as well. The danger of mass education is precisely 
that it may become very entertaining indeed; there are many great authors of the past who have 
survived centuries of oblivion and neglect, but it is still an open question whether they will be able 
to survive an entertaining version of what they have to say. (Arendt 1960, 284-285). 
 
 Neil Postman took up Arendt’s criticisms and then applied them to television in what 
remains a very satisfying book. Amusing Ourselves to Death, in its way, captures the core problems 
with the notion of entertainment. Postman offers what he calls ‘the three commandments of 
television’—commandments that may, with some modification, apply to the category of 
‘entertainment’ in general:  
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1. Thou shalt have no pre-requisites (“the learner must be allowed to enter at any point without 
prejudice…television is a nongraded curriculum and excludes no viewer for any reason, at 
any time…[it] undermines the idea that sequence and continuity have anything to do with 
thought itself” (Postman 1985, 147))  
2. Thou shalt induce no perplexity (“there must be nothing that has to be remembered, 
studied, applied or, worst of all, endured. It is assumed that any information, story or idea 
can be made immediately accessible, since the contentment, not the growth, of the learner is 
paramount” (147-148). 
3. Thou shalt avoid exposition like the ten plagues visited upon Egypt (“Arguments, hypotheses, 
discussions, reasons, refutations or any of the traditional instruments of reasoned discourse turn 
television into radio or, worse, third-rate printed matter…Nothing will be taught on television 
that cannot both be visualized and placed in a theatrical context” (148)). 
 
 Postman explicitly claims that “the name we may properly give to an education without 
prerequisites, perplexity, and exposition is entertainment” (148). And there are some striking 
similarities between the ‘commandments of television’ and the instructions given to contributors in, 
for example, Blackwell’s Pop Culture and Philosophy series: accessibility, clarity, and an injunction 
not to stray too far from the target piece of pop culture (no more than a couple pages without 
referring to it!). But there are obvious differences, too: every essay in the pop culture and philosophy 
genre does take up arguments and objections. It does engage in exposition, albeit exposition that 
anchors itself to its favored piece of pop culture. Writers in the genre are almost always at pains to 
note that they are introducing philosophy, not exhaustively displaying it. For whatever their 
limitations, the ‘and philosophy’ books maintain a foot in the ‘print culture’ that Postman idealizes. 
 Nevertheless, as Postman argues, the entertainment culture that surrounds us is not to be 
ignored—it shapes even our relation to the printed word. Arendt and Postman are not simply being 
curmudgeonly. They argue, rather, that certain sorts of thinking are intrinsically difficult, and that 
to make such things palatable to the masses will involve stripping them of those (difficult) 
characteristics that make them what they are. The true enemy of wisdom is not ignorance, Socrates 
says, but false knowledge. By presenting philosophical issues as entertainment, we encourage a false 
knowledge of the difficulty (and profundity) of philosophical reflection. It is seen as one more game 
people can play with language, except this time on a terrain of familiar distractions. 
 Is this different in principle from what we do in undergraduate instruction? The answer to 
this question has surprisingly wide-ranging implications. A philosophy professor who aimed at the 
entertainment of students might produce a greater knowledge of philosophy, but nevertheless 
promote a conception of philosophy as something to be consumed, or something to be engaged in 
recreationally, or something to be done when nothing good is on television. To paraphrase 
Postman’s worry about television: the problem isn’t that philosophy can be entertaining; the 
problem is that it won’t be anything else. Or to paraphrase McLuhan: the medium destroys the message. 
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This is philosophy’s version of a standoff: the pop culture enthusiast insists that using pop 
culture will increase philosophical literacy, and hence make available the tools of philosophical 
reflection for a larger audience. The pop culture pessimist thinks that the use of pop culture will 
increase philosophical illiteracy, as it encourages a conception of philosophy as just so much more 
entertainment—and entertainment encourages the easy, the shallow, the banal. Wherever one’s 
hopes lie, the objections and the hopes are both serious ones.  
There are two replies to this standoff that are worth considering. First, we ought to 
remember that Plato was not above employing entertainment for the very use we’re now 
considering—to encourage further philosophical reflection. The Platonic dialogue was (on one 
reading) designed to get people to engage further in philosophical training (by coming to the 
Academy, for example). Plato himself also saw the danger in knowing too little philosophy: it would 
encourage a garrulous spirit that wasn’t guided by the ‘love of truth,’ and persisted only in a desire 
to win arguments. This, to my mind, is a vindication of both sides of the standoff: entertainment can 
increase interest in philosophy, but it can also be dangerous. We are, of course, in a very different 
media environment from the one Plato saw. Plato regarded even writing itself as a threat to true 
philosophical exchange. We are in a much more dangerous position now, to be sure. But if our 
consistent danger is that we pass over all things without attention, regarding them only as more 
amusement, it must matter that some amusements are more reflective than others. Even if 
philosophy has become entertainment, it is at least reflective entertainment. 
And this leads directly to another point: in a culture such as ours, it may be impossible to 
avoid beginning with an instrumentalized, entertainment-driven version of philosophy. If we take 
seriously the Heideggerian problem of enframing, or the Marcusian/Horkheimerian diagnosis of an 
eclipse of reason, or, indeed, Postman’s Brave New World diagnosis of being amused to death, there 
may be no other way into philosophy except through the gauntlet of entertainment (doing x because 
x is fun). This is lamentable for many reasons, but it is, I daresay, better than nothing.  
Nevertheless, I think the worry raised by Arendt (and Postman, Adorno, Marcuse, and 
others) is one that we ought to take seriously. If we begin in entertainment, we might not be able to 
escape it. Sometimes, for some readers, I’m sure we won’t. If the medium shapes the message, as both 
Arendt and Postman (and McLuhan!) insist, presenting philosophy as entertainment may well 
change the very nature of what is presented—much like the use of images changed advertising, 
commercial breaks changed the news, and hyperlinks changed reading.  
It would be a mistake, however, to think that this worry is somehow uniquely appropriate 
in this particular genre of popular philosophy. The very same critique potentially applies to 
everything that garners a wide audience: we are a culture of entertainment, and through 
entertainment, we may (inadvertently) change the very things that are colonized by entertainment: 
the news, education, politics, and yes, philosophy. This is a critique that ought to be made—and 
ought to be made again and again. It is a critique that points to a significant problem in our culture, 
but the critique is in itself not a solution. Applied to the use of pop culture to popularize philosophy, 
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it is a critique of a symptom of a culture obsessed with entertainment. The critique is no different, 
in principle, from the critique of hyperbolic assertions designed to excite the attention of would-be 
readers—and this happens in a great many varieties of popular philosophy: the op-ed, the intro book, 
and even in the journal article that promises, in its title, to defend some bizarre view.  
If the critique of the entertainment culture is correct, the ‘and philosophy’ books are 
guilty—but they are no more guilty than any other version of popular philosophy. The fact that 
philosophy must prostitute itself to popular culture to get noticed in such a culture, while 
lamentable in many respects, may nevertheless be unavoidable: one must entertain to be noticed by 
anyone but the specialist. The choice of the public philosopher may thus come down to a Faustian 
bargain of sorts: entertain, thereby risking the debasement of the very thing you hope to encourage, 
or die in the anonymity of a culture that will settle for nothing less. 
 
And now, this… 
 To those outside of the discipline, most philosophy looks frivolous—that’s precisely the 
problem. Whether or not the pop culture genre exacerbates this problem is, ultimately, an empirical 
question—and one not easy to answer. I think the objections should be taken seriously. As someone 
who participates in the production of philosophical entertainment, I am worried about the potential 
effects wrought by our entertainment culture on all things sacred, or at least all things serious. But I 
am equally worried about a world where philosophical thinking is sequestered in academic journals, 
and entertainment culture faces no attempt at critical thinking. I am worried about a world where 
only the truly devoted are able to know anything at all about the discipline I have given much of my 
life to. The ‘and philosophy’ books should be understood, in my view, as part of the attempt to 
combat an entertainment culture from within that culture—even if we risk undermining such 
attempts with the very strategies we employ.20 
 
 Endnotes: 
1. One doesn’t usually hear much about a conspiratorial plot (I added that bit for fun), but the core 
criticisms are the same. 
2. Are these books really filled with ‘incompetence’? A competent contribution to scholarship is one 
that makes advances—that deals with technical argumentative moves, surveys and responds to the 
existing literature. But to judge the genre on this criterion makes little sense. These books aim to 
introduce philosophy, not to advance the state of scholarship. To claim that the pop culture books 
are incompetent as an introduction to the central issues of philosophy, moreover, is simply ridiculous. 
I have never read a single contribution to such a book that was not competent. To be sure, I have 
disagreed with particular claims about, say, how to understand the significance of the unity of the 
virtues in Aristotle. But I have never seen a chapter that involved gross misrepresentations of central 
claims, or arguments, or even the lay of the theoretical landscape. This is hardly surprising. The vast 
majority of contributions come from persons with PhDs in the discipline, and all come from people 
with extensive graduate training. If these persons could not competently present basic philosophical 
ideas, the discipline would have a much more significant problem than our culture’s current 
philosophical illiteracy. The problem would be that our graduate programs in philosophy were 
unable to produce competent teachers. 
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3. The genre of the Socratic dialogue, it must be remembered, was a popular genre. Nevertheless, it would be 
delusional to think that the volumes of popular philosophy now available are full of Plato-worthy writing. 
They simply aren’t. Of course, the same could be said of any series of contemporary books. 
4. Stephen Hawking made this claim, though he is hardly alone. 
5. William Irwin has suggested this in a number of places—in his Psychology Today blog, for example. 
6. In the interest of full disclosure, I should point out that I have edited (or co-edited) six books in 
Blackwell’s Philosophy & Pop Culture Series: Family Guy and Philosophy (2007), The Office and 
Philosophy (2008), X-Men and Philosophy and Twilight and Philosophy (2009, both co-edited with 
Rebecca Housel), 30 Rock and Philosophy (2010), and Arrested Development and Philosophy (2012, 
co-edited with Kristopher Phillips). 
7. Carlin Romano’s recent America the Philosophical notwithstanding. 
8. The use of the masculine pronoun ‘he’ is intentional. 80% of professional philosophers in the US are 
male, compared to 60% across the academy. This has long been recognized (by some, at any rate) as 
a significant problem for the discipline. Our collective exclusion of minority groups of various kinds 
certainly does not aid the cause of public philosophy. 
9. Plato’s own approach to philosophical writing seems to have involved a fusion of both approaches. 
Plato applies the tools of philosophy to social and political questions, but he also utilizes many of the 
dramatic and comedic tropes of his day. 
10. http://philosophersanon.blogspot.com/2009/04/doom-pop-culture-and-philosophy.html Last 
accessed June, 2016. 
11. http://philosophersanon.blogspot.com/2009/04/doom-pop-culture-and-philosophy.html Last 
accessed June, 2016. 
12. The first question one might ask is this: why has this blogger read so many of these books if he truly 
thinks they’re worthless? The answer, of course, is that he hasn’t. He probably has not read a single 
volume, let alone multiple. This doesn’t mean he’s wrong. Perhaps, like a number of essays in the 
pop culture books, he’s attempting to illustrate a topic of philosophical interest: induction maybe, 
or the fallacy of hasty generalization. 
13. By, for example, highlighting how vague the criticisms are, or how they aren’t supported with even a 
little bit of evidence, or pointing out their implicit narcissism, or pointing out that the kind of blog 
Spiros is running is in fact in the same genre as the pop culture books. I will also refrain from pointing 
out the performative contradictions involved in making bad arguments against bad arguments. 
14. Practitioners of ‘analytic philosophy’ (a redundancy, to be sure—as if any philosophy could do 
without analysis!) often complain about just this feature of the philosophical traditions of 
phenomenology and post-structuralism. Devotees of so-called ‘continental philosophy’ (an ugly, 
ethnocentric phrase that unabashedly proclaims that the continent that matters for philosophy is Europe) 
likewise find the jargon of analytic philosophy every bit as burdensome and esoteric as any 
phenomenologist’s. A welcome development in recent years has been the emergence of a group of 
professional philosophers who speak both languages, and who can successfully translate between them. 
15. Can we be blamed for this conception of the discipline? In part, I think we can. As we work away on 
our philosophical projects, we very often lose the desire to explain to those outside of the discipline 
what we’re doing. (And we sometimes even lose the ability to do this). This was a problem even in 
ancient Greece. It is by no means new. 
16. Was philosophy taken seriously in the years before the pop culture books? No. And at that point, we 
were busy blaming Derrida. (One merely has to think of the letters of protest written in response to 
the decision of Cambridge University (in 1992) to award Derrida an honorary degree.) 
17. How do we handle philosophy’s place in the cultural imagination? How do we successfully insist on 
its relevance in a culture that often seems to have little interest in it? It seems to me that two different 
answers have been offered. One answer has been to try to make philosophy itself into science. This 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 3, Number 1, 2020 
42 
is an old idea, and one of wide-ranging appeal—it was advocated by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, 
Russell, and so many more. Another answer is to write more accessibly—to add to one’s 
philosophical labors a civic one: popularizing. The two answers can be given at once. Descartes, after 
all, tried to do just that. He wanted philosophy both to be scientific and to be widely available—
hence the translation of the Meditations into a common language (French) rather than just the 
language of scholars (Latin). But the answers can also pull in opposite directions. 
18. This claim appears in the (sometimes contested) Seventh Letter. 
19. For an excellent reading of specific Platonic dialogues in this light, see James Arieti’s wonderful (and, 
in my view, under-appreciated) Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1991). 
20. I would like to thank Bill Irwin for comments on an early draft of this paper. 
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